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In this article I will argue that we are witnessing at this moment the third wave of biological
psychiatry. This framework conceptualizes mental disorders as brain disorders of a special
kind that requires amultilevel approach ranging from genes to psychosocial mechanisms. In
contrast to earlier biological psychiatry approaches, the mental plays a more prominent role
in the third wave.This will become apparent by discussing the recent controversy evolving
around the recently published DSM-5 and the competing transdiagnostic Research Domain
Criteria approach of the National Institute of Mental Health that is build on concepts of
cognitive neuroscience. A look at current conceptualizations in biological psychiatry as well
as at some discussions in current philosophy of mind on situated cognition, reveals that
the thesis, that mental brain disorders are brain disorders has to be qualiﬁed with respect
to how mental states are constituted and with respect to multilevel explanations of which
factors contribute to stable patterns of psychopathological signs and symptoms.
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WHAT IS BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY?
As a ﬁrst approximation we can say that it ties psychiatry closely
to the biology of the brain. Under such a broad characterization
today nearly everyone would qualify as a biological psychiatrist,
as only very few would deny such a connection. However, there
are stronger and more controversial claims, for example the onto-
logical claim that psychiatric disorders are disorders of the brain,
or, on the therapeutic level, that the best therapies are biological
ones like medication or deep brain stimulation. However, many
biological psychiatrists would not share these stronger claims, so
this characterization seems too narrow.
To better understand the characteristics of the thirdwave, it will
behelpful to take a short look at theﬁrst and secondwave in thehis-
tory of psychiatry (Shorter, 1998). The ﬁrst wave in the second half
of the nineteenth century can be best understood as a new research
agenda. It was not somuch characterized by the idea that themen-
tal and the nervous system are closely linked – this was already
believed by ancient philosophers – but rather by the ambition
to uncover the relation between mind and brain by doing sys-
tematic research linking neuropathology and mental disorder and
by using the experimental method in animals and humans. Wil-
helm Griesinger (1817–1868), one of the most important ﬁgures
of this ﬁrst wave, famously declared: mental disorders are disor-
ders of the brain. Note, that this was not primarily intended as
a reductionist claim, but rather as a statement intended to delin-
eate his ideas against the two prevailing approaches of that time:
the moral approach on the one hand, and the somatic approach,
linking mental disorder to body processes in the lung, liver or
other organs, on the other hand. Nevertheless, Griesingers claim
was not at all uncontroversial as theorists felt that such a brain
approach would not do justice to the intricate psychopathologi-
cal phenomena psychiatrists dealt with. For example, Karl Jaspers,
the philosopher-psychiatrist, called 1913 the localationist models
of two main protagonists of the ﬁrst wave, Theodor Meynert and
Carl Wernicke, “brain mythologies.”
In the early twentieth century, there was a decline in the bio-
logical approaches through various developments. Emil Kraeplin,
one of the most inﬂuential psychiatrists at his time, started as an
opponent to biological psychiatry, and developed his diagnostic
system on systematic observations of symptoms and course of
mental disorders, laying the groundwork for the later DSM. Also,
psychological models, inspired by psychoanalysis and behavior-
ism became increasingly fashionable and had a large impact on
therapy.
The second wave of biological psychiatry started only in the
second half of the twentieth century andwas, according to Shorter,
driven by two new discoveries. The ﬁrst was genetics, which could
show that severe mental disorders, in particular schizophrenia,
have a strong genetic component. The second was the discov-
ery of efﬁcient medication for various mental disorders (1949
lithium, 1952 chlorpromazin, 1957 imipramin, 1958 haloperidol,
1963 diazepam). They quickly became a major pillar of psychi-
atric treatment and contributed strongly to the opening and later
disappearance of the large mental asylums in the second half of
the last century. Soon, the concept of a neurochemical imbalance
of neurotransmitters became the favored explanatory model for
psychiatric disorders. Interestingly, at the same time as psychia-
try for the ﬁrst time used effective medications, the movement
of antipsychiatry emerged. It was part of a more general political
protest against tradition starting in the 1960s and declared “men-
tal illness as a myth” (Szasz, 1961). It also was quite effective in
discrediting one of themost effective treatments for severe depres-
sion, electroconvulsive therapy, supported among other things by
the impressive movie “One ﬂew over the cockoo’s nest” (1975) by
Milos Forman. So although the second wave was in effect quite
successful there was always some opposition against it on one
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hand, but on the other hand those insights and practices that were
helpful for patients are now integrated into daily practice.
So what is the third wave of biological psychiatry? I want to
suggest that this wave has started in the last two decades of the
twentieth century and is now in full progress. Again, it has been
driven by methodological and technological progress. Since the
declaration of the last decade of the twentieth century as the
decade of the brain by the president of the United States, neu-
roscience has developed into one of the largest research programs
worldwide. According to my view, there were two developments
particularly relevant in the transition of the second wave into the
thirdwave. The ﬁrst is the progress in themolecular neurosciences.
The journal Molecular Psychiatry, founded in 1997, is now one of
the ﬁelds most prestigious and most cited journals. It became
increasingly clear that the effects of psychiatric drugs are not pri-
marily exerted via the level of neurotransmitters in the synaptic
cleft, but that there is up- and down-regulation of receptors, effects
on intracellular cascades, and even regrowth of neurons in the
hippocampus. The picture of the neurobiological changes under-
lying psychiatric disorders and treatment thus becamemuchmore
complex and differentiated and it became apparent that differ-
ent levels of brain organization are important which interact in a
complex way. The second development was the birth of cognitive
neuroscience and neuroimaging. This ﬁeld studies information
processing in the brain by combining the methods of experimen-
tal psychology with tools to record brain activity or to stimulate
the brain. In fact, neuroimaging, in particular functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) has contributed much to public
“brain awareness,” by (although wrongly) suggesting that we can
literally watch “the brain at work.” With the ﬁrst human study
published in 1991, fMRI has today become a major research tool
in psychology as well as in psychiatry. This development could not
have taken place without a large increase in computational power.
In fact, computational neuroscience which tries to develop math-
ematical models of brain function, has become an important tool
in explaining neurocognitive processes and recently the program
of computational psychiatry has begun to evolve (Montague et al.,
2012). Furthermethods and technologies have become available to
investigate the interplay of genetics, experience and environment
in the etiology and neural explanation of psychiatric disorders like
imaging genetics, epigenetics, optogenetics, or deep brain stim-
ulation. Also big science, combining large – omic datasets like
the (epi)genom, metabolom, proteome, or connectom with clin-
ical data is becoming more important in psychiatric research and
allows for new ways of discovery. The underlying model is that
of systems medicine, understood as an interdisciplinary ﬁeld of
study that looks at the dynamic systems of the human body as
part of an integrated whole, incorporating biochemical, physio-
logical, and environmental interactions that sustain organismic
life. In brain science, the paradigm of localationist thinking is sub-
stituted increasingly by thinking in functional systems and brain
connectivity patterns (Buckholtz and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012).
At this moment, we are at a critical stage of the third wave.
In fact, progress in the ﬁrst decade of this century has been so
impressive that researchers as well as media have been overenthu-
siastic with regard to the power of the new methods. In particular
neuroimaging results, probably due to their seemingly simple
and straightforward presentation, have ignited the imagination of
researchers, lay people and the media. Results are reported, simi-
lar to genetic results, in a oversimpliﬁed causal language (“love is
in the ACC,” “the God spot,” “gene for schizophrenia discovered,”
etc.). Such oversimpliﬁed messages are well for drawing attention
to headlines, but way over what really can be inferred from most
studies. Consequently, neuroscience has recently been criticized
for its overambitious claims, and the ﬁeld of “critical neuroscience”
has ﬂourished in the last 5 years immensely with an increasing
number of books, papers and blogs (for a respectable example
compare Slaby and Choudhury, 2011). Actually, in neuroscience
in general, as well as in cognitive neurosciences and neuroimaging
in particular self-critical articles concerning methods have begun
to be increasingly published (e.g., Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Button
et al., 2012) which is a healthy self-correcting development.
According to the third wave of biological psychiatry, mental
disorders are relatively stable prototypical, dysfunctional patterns
of experience and behavior that can be explained by dysfunctional
neural systems at various levels. As with any understanding of dis-
ease in general the notion of a “dysfunction” inevitable involves
normative judgments of what is regarded as normal, functional,
healthy on the one hand, and as abnormal, dysfunctional, patho-
logical on the other hand. Further below I will come back to
normative issues. But before I do so, let’s look at the concept
of mental disorder within biological psychiatry.
WHAT ARE MENTAL DISORDERS?
Modern psychiatry has taken a lot of effort tomake the description
of psychopathology reliable by introducing standardized ways of
exploring, describing and rating psychopathological patterns over
time. In America, psychiatric disorders are diagnosed using the
DSM-IV (published 1994), the Diagnostic Statistics and Manuals
of Mental Disorders, the ofﬁcial handbook of the American Psy-
chiatric Association (APA), sometimes referred to as the “bible” of
psychiatry. According to DSM-IV mental disorders are diagnosed
by carefully checking if subjects fulﬁll a certain number of psy-
chopathological criteria for a certain amount of time. DSM-IV is
agnostic on etiopathogenesis, i.e., the causal genesis of disorders,
but rather has put emphasis of establishing a reliable, intersub-
jective schema for diagnoses on the psychopathological level. But
what about validity, i.e., what is measured or rather intended to
be measured with DSM-criteria? What kind of things are men-
tal disorders? Kendler et al. (2011a) have distinguished four types
of kinds that mental disorders could be. Essentialist kinds are
based on an essence, e.g., an underlying cause, from which the
deﬁning features (the typical symptoms) do arise. Although this
theory ﬁts to some cases like progressive paralysis in syphilis or
Mendelian defects in cholesterol metabolisms, it is now widely
acknowledged that this model neither ﬁts most chronic diseases
as atherosclerosis, hypertension or autoimmune disease, nor psy-
chiatric disorders. Rather, it is generally accepted that psychiatric
disorders arise from a multitude of causes that are probabilisti-
cally related to signs and symptoms. Even in cases, where family
and twin studies unambiguously have demonstrated that most
of the variance is explained by genetics factors (e.g., up to 80%
in schizophrenia) there is no single gene causing this disorder.
Recently discovered risk variants explain only a tiny portion of
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variance, usually less than 1%, although, using imaging genetics,
they can be shown to have much stronger effects on the brain
level (Walter et al., 2011). A second approach is to understand psy-
chiatric disorders as socially constructed kinds which are brought
about solely by the human activity of describing and classifying
but not by an underlying structure independent of human con-
structs. Although this still is a popular thesis in the camps of
cultural relativists and anti-psychiatry, this theory is rarely taken
serious today. Instead, it is now widely acknowledged that cultural
inﬂuences and social factors play important roles in the expres-
sion of symptoms, e.g., in the content of delusions. But it is also
clear that for certain prototypical diseases (e.g., schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, depression, and some anxiety disorders) there
are invariant patterns in experience and behavior despite emi-
nent cultural differences. Many people think that what matters
most is how we handle mental problems. So maybe psychiatric
disorders are best understood as practical kinds. This approach
holds that psychiatric disorders do not carve nature at its joints
but just are those kinds which are most useful for certain pur-
poses, ranging from medical ones (diagnoses and treatment) to
sociological or even political ones (this is the point of departure
of anti-psychiatry). This model is grounded in pragmatist phi-
losophy and instrumentalism and has some appeal. In fact, the
philosophy of DSM is very close to this approach with its agnos-
tic and atheoretical framework. Although the practical kind of
view avoids metaphysical discussion (like: What is schizophrenia
really?), it gives us no advice as how classiﬁcations should be build
and goes against many realistic intuitions that are the basis of suc-
cessful applications not only in medicine. Instead, Kendler et al.
(2011a) argue for a concept that is based on a model originat-
ing in the philosophy of biology, dealing with the problem how
species are classiﬁed and on recent developments in the theory of
neuroscience: the concept of mechanistic property clusters (MPC).
According to this view, the items to be classiﬁed rest on proper-
ties that need not to be shared by all members of a class, rather
they should be understood as a cluster within an abstract space of
features or properties in a multidimensional space. Some of those
features may be more essence like, some more practical. Impor-
tantly, theMPC-view encourages the thought that there are robust
explanatory structures to be discovered underlying psychiatric
disorders. These explanatory multidimensional structures (genes,
cell receptors, neural systems, psychological states, environmen-
tal inputs, social-cultural variables) are interacting in a complex
and intertwined way, are sometimes fuzzy, but nevertheless sta-
ble. Importantly, it cannot simply be read from the superﬁcial
structure of items if they belong to the same kind. Rather, their
membership is explained by the causal mechanisms that regularly
ensure that their properties are instantiated together (a historical
account). The interaction typically is inter-level, but can also be
on the level on symptoms, thus mutually re-enforcing the pat-
tern, e.g., in depression insomnia predisposes to tiredness and
guilt predisposes to suicidal ideation. As MPC kinds are deﬁned
in part by the mechanisms that underlie and sustain them, the
reductionist intuitions of old wave biological psychiatry are par-
tially satisﬁed. However, the kind cannot be fully explained and
thus understood if inter-level interactions, which are often hidden
to the subject as well as to the external observer, are not taken
into account. For example, it has been empirically shown that
subjective explanations for depressive episodes by patients do not
correlate with objective risk factors for depression (Kendler et al.,
2011b) – a ﬁnding that makes it likely that explanations based on
just a selection of levels (subjective experience and remembered
behavioral events) do not explain depression well. The same can
be said for simpliﬁed biological models of depression as a neuro-
transmitter deﬁcit that ignores many of the other levels. Although
the MPC-model does not tell us in advance what the relevant
causal mechanisms are, it is consistent with the new biological
wave in psychiatry which we will now characterize by describing a
controversy around the introduction of DSM-5.
DSM-5 AND ITS CRITICS
On May 18th 2013 DSM-5 was launched at the meeting of the
APA. When the APA started to work on DSM-5, it was hoped
that it would be able to integrate new dimensional approaches
(constellation of symptom dimensions, rather than categories of
disorders) and more of the exploding neurobiological research
results from the molecular and cognitive neurosciences. However,
this hope was frustrated. Shortly before publication, the APA-
DSM task force decided against these ideas, as it felt it would be
too early and that research was not far enough to deliver sound
evidence that could be integrated. Moreover, another feature of
DSM-5 steered much controversies. Diagnostic criteria for some
disorders were changed and new disorders were included. For
example, the former exclusion criterion for the minimum dura-
tion of a depressive episode (normally 2 weeks, but after the death
of a signiﬁcant other at least 2 months) was skipped, which was
criticized as the medicalization and pathologization of the normal
human experience of grief. Diagnoses like binge eating disorder,
mild cognitive disorder, and disruptive mood regulation disor-
der in childhood were introduced. These decisions were heavily
criticized,most prominently by the psychiatrist who led the devel-
opment of DMS-IV, Allen Frances. In fact, Frances had been
arguing for years that DSM-5 was on the wrong track by intro-
ducing more and more disorders without taking into account that
these will be overdiagnosed in practice and will create millions
of new patients as well as justiﬁcation for medication that is not
indicated. In concert with the practices that advertisement for
medication in the U.S. is allowed (not in most European states)
thiswould lead to severe individual and societal side effects of over-
medication, so the prediction of Frances and many other critics.
Notably, he didnot shy away to accuse himself of havingperformed
similar mistakes by introducing three diagnoses in DSM-IV which
he now regards as a mistake: attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disor-
der (ADHD), child bipolar disorder and the Asperger-syndrome
(a form of high-functioning autism). In his book “Saving Nor-
mal” (Frances, 2013) he argues that DSM-IV has been and DSM-5
will even be more leading to overdiagnoses, to pathologizing nor-
mal children and to the treatment of only slightly dysfunctional
persons at the expense of taking care of the severely ill.
Here I will not discuss his arguments and the truth of his
prognosis in detail, although it is highly likely that some of his
predictions will become true, but rather point to an event sur-
rounding the introduction of DSM-5 that makes the claims of the
third wave of biological psychiatry clearer.
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THOMAS INSEL’S ATTACK ON DSM-5
The date of the launch of DSM-5 at the APAmeeting onMay 18th
was long known to everybody in the ﬁeld. So it was probably not
by pure chance that just 3 weeks earlier, on April 29th a blog was
posted byThomas Insel, a renownedneuroscientist himself (work-
ing in particular on oxytocin and vasopressin in animal research)
and since 2002 director of the National Institute of Mental Health,
the world’s largest research institute investigating psychiatric dis-
orders. He declared that “the weakness (of DSM-5) is its lack of
validity. Unlike our deﬁnitions of ischemic heart disease, lym-
phoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus
about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory
measure. In the rest of medicine, this would be equivalent to cre-
ating diagnostic systems based on the nature of chest pain or the
quality of fever. Indeed, symptom-based diagnosis, once common
in other areas of medicine, has been largely replaced in the past
half century as we have understood that symptoms alone rarely
indicate the best choice of treatment” (Insel, 2013). This is a harsh
judgment. And he also drew consequences: “That is why National
Institute ofMentalHealth (NIMH)will be re-orienting its research
away from DSM categories.” This is quite a severe conclusion: just
before the ofﬁcial diagnostic textbook of theAPA is published after
more than a decade of work, the largest research organization on
mental health declares that it will orient its research away from
DSM categories. Why? “(I)t is critical to realize that we cannot
succeed if we use DSM categories as the“gold standard.”The diag-
nostic system has to be based on the emerging research data, not
on the current symptom-based categories. Imagine deciding that
ECGs (=electrocardiograms,H.W.) were not useful becausemany
patientswith chest pain did not have ECGchanges. That is whatwe
have been doing for decades when we reject a biomarker because
it does not detect a DSM category. We need to begin collecting
the genetic, imaging, physiologic, and cognitive data to see how all
the data – not just the symptoms – cluster and how these clusters
relate to treatment response” (Insel, 2013).
So, in a nutshell: psychiatry has not been able to develop any
objective laboratory test for clinical use because the current devel-
opment of such tests is based on superﬁcial criteria (symptoms),
but not on the causal explanatory structures that underly them.
If these structures exist he is right: it is difﬁcult to make progress
if you are measured by the ﬁt with a descriptive, possibly faulty
diagnostic system.
But there are further, homemade, problems within scientiﬁc
psychiatry. Shitij Kapur, the Dean of the Institute of Psychia-
try in London, and coauthors, among them Thomas Insel, gave
three possible explanations for slow progress (Kapur et al., 2012).
First, many studies in biological psychiatry are underpowered,
i.e., they perform p-value chasing with small numbers of sub-
jects (or animals). A good example is psychiatric genetics, but the
same argument has been put forward for neuroscience in general
(Button et al., 2012). Secondly, many studies are only approxi-
mately replicated, i.e., with different methods, different scanners,
different paradigms, making it difﬁcult to judge whether an effect
is really stable. Thirdly: many stable effects, i.e., effects with
large effect sizes are only found in extreme comparisons, i.e., by
comparing patients with healthy controls. However, for clinical
purposes it would be much more interesting to compare different
patient populations. Kapur et al. (2012) also suggest methods to
improve the situation, including to increase power, share data, and
to report data more accurately. Most importantly, they argue for
a stratiﬁed medicine (and psychiatry), i.e., for the identiﬁcation
of biomarkers or cognitive tests that stratify a broad-illness phe-
notype into a ﬁnite number of treatment-relevant subgroups. To
put it into their metaphor of jacket producing: not to hope for a
jacket with one-ﬁts all (the usual approach) but also not hoping
for a personally tailored jacket (like in the overambitious project
of personalizedmedicine) but rather to go for a series of chest sizes
of jackets for different groups.
RESEARCH DOMAIN CRITERIA: COGNITIVE SYSTEMS,
NEURAL CIRCUITS, AND DIMENSIONS OF BEHAVIOR
Aparadigmatic exampleof how the thirdwaveof biological psychi-
atry is trying to get a grip onmental disorder and their underlying
mechanisms is the initiative of research domain criteria (RDoC)
developed by the NIMH which has been suggested as an alterna-
tive to investigatemental disorders and develop new classiﬁcations
that are based on observable behavior and neurobiological mea-
sures. According to Morris and Cuthbert (2012) it developed
out of two initiatives that targeted schizophrenia, in particular
the MATRICS (measurement and treatment research to improve
cognition in schizophrenia) and the CNTRICS (cognitive neuro-
science treatment research to improve cognition in schizophrenia).
RDoC can be regarded as a generalization of these initiatives
being constructed for application to all mental disorders. It is
based on three central assumptions: (1) mental disorders are pre-
sumed to be disorders of brain circuits. (2) Tools of neuroscience,
including neuroimaging, electrophysiology and new methods for
measuring neural connections can be used to identify dysfunctions
of neural circuits. (3) Data from genetics research and clinical
neuroscience will yield biosignatures that will augment clinical
signs and symptoms for the purposes of clinical intervention and
management. It also includes developmental processes and inter-
actionwith the environment as orthogonal dimensions that should
inform hypotheses and conclusions derived from the RDoC orga-
nization structure. This structure is organized as a 2-dimensional
schema. One dimension includes constructs that represent ﬁve
core domains of mental functioning: Negative valence systems,
positive valence systems, cognitive systems, systems for social
processes and attention/arousal systems. Each of these domains
includes subconstructs (around ﬁve). For example the negative
valence systems include: active threat (“fear”), potential threat
(“anxiety”), sustained threat, loss and frustrative non-reward. To
take another example: the cognitive systems domain comprises
attention, perception, working memory, declarative memory, lan-
guage behavior, and cognitive (effortful) control. The second
dimension consists of units of levels of organization on which
the constructs can be measured. These levels are deﬁned as fol-
lows: genes, molecules, cells, circuits, physiology, behavioral,
self-reports, and paradigms. The “circuits” unit of analysis refers
to measures that can index the activity of neural circuits, either
through functional neuroimaging or through recordings previ-
ously validated as circuit indices (e.g., fear-potentiated startle).
“Physiology” refers to well-established measures that have been
validated by assessing various constructs, but that do not measure
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brain circuit activity directly (e.g., heart rate, cortisol). “Behavior”
may refer either to systematically observed behavior or to perfor-
mance on a behavior task such a working memory. The advantage
of this conceptualization in comparison to a purely symptom and
course based system like DSM is that it is based on research on
different levels, allows to characterize patients dimensionally, not
categorically (diagnosis present or not) and that it is open to new
evidence. Clearly, it cannot simply substitute DSM,which is based
on long clinical experience, but it will inform classiﬁcation based
on multilevel science and might, in the long term, identify sub-
groups of patients that show characteristic constellations within
this matrix that are helpful for categorization, treatment or man-
agement of patients. In the above mentioned blog Thomas Insel
has announced that the NIMH will try to fund studies which fol-
low such a transdiagnostic, systematic approach instead of studies
that try to ﬁnd neural correlates of categories that are simply based
on the (superﬁcial) clustering of signs and symptoms.
EVALUATING THE THIRD WAVE OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY:
A VIEW FROM INSIDE
By now the general approach or framework of the third wave
of biological psychiatry should have become clear. It is focus-
ing on a research-inspired, multi-level approach to understand
what psychiatric disorders are, what mechanisms underly signs
and symptoms and how an understanding of those mechanisms
might help in classiﬁcation, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment.
Note, that the approach does not entail the claim that biological
approaches in a narrow sense are the best therapeutic approaches.
It is as such neutral to the question what intervention will prove
best to treat whatever there is. For example it may very well be that
psychotherapeutic approaches will emerge as the best way to treat
certain types of disorders. In fact, psychotherapists see no gen-
eral problem in integrating their approach into such a framework
as psychological mechanisms and principles that are effective in
psychotherapy can be conceptualized as part of cognitive neuro-
science itself (Walter et al., 2009; Disner et al., 2011). Also, the role
of psychosocial and cultural factors can be integrated effortlessly as
theMPC approach by Kendler et al. (2011a,b)makes clear: if social
factors or societal and cultural mechanisms are part of the causal
machinery that contributes to the instantiation of typical clusters
of signs and symptoms that characterize psychiatric disorders they
are part of the underlying explanatory structure.
However, probably many or at least some people will still view
this approach skeptically. Indeed, there are several problems and
limitations. To name just four of them: ﬁrst, it could still be argued
that the framework favors the neurobiological over other factors,
as it entails the idea that psychiatric disorders are brain disorders.
It will make no difference if you call psychiatric disorders “disor-
ders of the brain” or “disorders of brain circuits” and thus do not
justice to the mental within the concept of mental disorders. Sec-
ond, the third wave does not include a solution to the normativity
problem, namely the question when a constellation of psychologi-
cal signs and symptoms is already a disorder or when it is still part
of “normal experience,” so it will still promote a medicalization of
life problems. Third, even if we somehow could solve the ﬁrst two
problems, it might be argued that a focus on the brain will lead to
inefﬁcient resource allocation because the outcome for patients is
not worth the effort be put in. History has shown that all general
claims that we will in the near future know “the” causes of mental
disorders have failed, and the continuous failure of neurobiology
(with some exceptions) to sufﬁciently explain or predict mental
disorders shows that it cannot account for such complex phenom-
ena. Therefore, we should rather focus on the well-known psy-
chosocial factors contributing to the development or sustainment
of psychiatric disorders which are muchmore relevant in practice.
A recent critique of the thesis that “addiction is a brain disease”
can be interpreted as a condensed combination of these worries. It
argues that addictionwould only be a brain disease if it has (i) neu-
ral correlates, (ii) these correlates are pathological and (iii) that
pathology is sufﬁcient for the person to have a disease, in almost
any accessible environment Levy, 2013. As addicts are able to quit
in certain environments, addiction would not qualify as a brain
disease. This is a very clever argument as it uses one feature of the
multilevel approach, namely the role of environmental factors, to
argue against the “disorder of brain circuits thesis.” Indeed, there
is a grain of truth in this argument, but only insofar as it helps
to distinguish “organic or neurological” from “mental or psychi-
atric” disorders. For example, neurodegenerative diseases like M.
HuntingtonorAlzheimerwill progress in almost any environment,
whereas drinking might stop. However, there are two problems
with this argument: ﬁrst of all, it confuses behavior (drinking)
with the disorder (alcohol addiction). It is well known that peo-
ple suffering from alcohol addiction who manage to quit, still are
addicted life-long and have a high propensity for relapse – exactly
this might be explained by the brain disorder thesis. Secondly,
the argument puts the stake much too high. Using the same kind
of argument it could be argued that phenylketonuria, a genetically
transmitted severemetabolic disorder is not really ametabolic dis-
order as it can be effectively treated by a diet, i.e., the pathology is
not sufﬁcient for a person to have a disease in almost any accessible
environment.
Finally, some may argue, that also the third wave of biolog-
ical psychiatry, like the preceding waves, will tend to devalue an
approach to psychiatry that focues on the personal level. For exam-
ple, the concept of MPC is based on the idea that regards minds as
brains and brains as kind of machines that are causally effected by
different levels. This approach, so the argument may go, ignores
the personal level even if it may pay lip service to the subjective by
for example including “subjective reports” in the RDoC grid.
There are several ways to response to these critiques from
within, some of which I will mention here. First, admittedly,
there is a common misunderstanding on the role of neurobio-
logical ﬁndings in psychiatric disorders. Very often, it is either
said, implicitly assumed, or implied that the mere fact that there
is a neurobiological correlate of a mental dysfunction is already
a proof that the “causes” of the respective disorder are biological
in the same way as for neurological disorders. But this clearly is a
misconception. Because every mental state has a correlate in the
brain,we should be able to ﬁnd at least in principle neurobiological
correlates of any mental state, pathological or not. So the question
is not, whether there is a neurocognitive correlate or mechanism,
but whether it is pathological, how it came into being, whether it
is persistent, whether and how it can be inﬂuenced, and so forth.
In fact, the neurobiological misunderstanding even goes further in
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many cases as often it is wrongly concluded that the existence of a
“brain signature”(to use amore neutral term)would already imply
that the disorder cannot be controlled or changed by psychological
means, or even that it is inborn or genetically caused, implications
which clearly are non-sequitures, but widely believed.
Second, the normative problem indeed has to be addressed –
not only by biological psychiatry, but also by any other approach to
psychiatry, and not only for psychiatric but also for all concepts of
disorders – and consequently it has been discussed in medicine in
general. As it is in no way speciﬁc for psychiatry, let alone biologi-
cal psychiatry, I will not discuss it here in detail but justmake some
remarks. It is clear that the sheer discovery of neural correlates or
mechanisms of a disorder cannot prove a state as pathologically.
This can be done only by spelling out a concept of normal func-
tioning. If a biological approach claims to be able to deﬁne mental
disorders without reference to norms it must fail. Normativity in
the context of mental disorders comes at least in three guises, “sta-
tistical,” “biological design” or “value-preference laden” (Graham,
2013, p. 59). For example, most deﬁnitions of mental disorders
include a criterion of suffering or of clinical relevance, that only
can be spelled out with respect to a norm that cannot be read sim-
ply frombiological facts. I will return to this issue later. Although it
has to be admitted that the third wave of biological psychiatry does
not take a speciﬁc stance to the normativity problem, it should be
noted that this can be only used as a critique against variants of
biological psychiatry that explicitly claim that normality can be
inferred simply from biological measures.
Thirdly, why has neurobiology failed to deliver better results
for explanation, diagnosis, prognosis or treatment? Some answers
relating to methodological problems have been already discussed
above (Kapur et al., 2012). However, a further explanation for only
modest progress is often notmentioned. These are the ethical con-
straints under which biological psychiatric research has to operate
which does make progress difﬁcult. In contrast to other medical
disciplines psychiatric research can access the “organ of the mind,”
the brain, only indirectly. There is no known ethically justiﬁable
way to directly access brain tissue to investigate assumedmolecular
mechanisms. In contrast, the heart, the liver, the kidney and many
other organs can be accessed directly in therapy and research by
taking biopsies or measuring metabolites in the blood. There are
only a few exceptions to this barrier, for example the possibility
to measure certain molecules non-invasively with magnetic reso-
nance spectroscopy, or with research windows related to invasive
therapeutic procedures in epilepsy surgery or deep brain stimu-
lation. Direct access to the brain in animal research also has its
problems, because rodents and humans differ in many respects
and animal experiments are confronted with ethical issues, too. So
the “failure”of biological psychiatry is not necessarily related to its
concepts or theoretical approach, but partly may be explained by
important and relevant ethical barriers we have implemented in
human research for good reasons.
Fourthly, does a biological psychiatry approach imply disre-
spect for persons? First note, that this critic in its most general
and radical form is not conﬁned to biological psychiatry but to
any psychiatric approach that claims that there are mental disor-
ders in the ﬁrst place. This antipsychiatric argument claims that
mental illness in general is a myth by confusing sickness with life
difﬁculties and by stigmatizing people with mental problems as
having a disorder and thus not giving them the credit and respon-
sibility for what they do and chose to be. In a more speciﬁc and
much less radical, but more frequent variant (not claiming the
non-reality of mental disorders) a biological approach of psy-
chiatry is accused of resulting in an overenthusiastic reliance on
medication and an insufﬁcient use of understanding the life stories
and real-world problems of patients. Without doubt, overmedica-
tion is a problem in certain strands of psychiatry and admittedly
this may be due to the fact of an oversimpliﬁed picture of mental
disorders (“For depression you need to substitute serotonine like
insuline in diabetes”). However, many of these implications are
not inherent to the concepts of the third wave of biological psy-
chiatry but rather are based on older conceptions that postulated
a close connection between etiology and therapy, that has been
abandoned today in current practice. For depression for exam-
ple there was a distinction between endogenous depression (from
within, medication, no talking cure), neurotic depression (orig-
inating in childhood, talking cure, no medication) and reactive
depression (understandable reaction after a life event).
The aforementioned responses to a critique to biological psy-
chiatry were given fromwithin psychiatry and psychiatric research
in itself. Many of these issues revolve about the “disorder” part of
mental disorders. However, I think that a more comprehensive
way of assessing the prospects of biological psychiatry can only be
found when we turn to the “mental” part of a theory of mental
disorders. In order to do so we can turn to a rich resource that has
reﬂected on the concept of the mental for a long time: philosophy
of mind.
RECONSIDERING BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY: A PHILOSOPHY
OF MIND PERSPECTIVE
If wewant to understandwhatmental disorders are thenwe should
take the question what “the mental” is more seriously. Tradition-
ally, there has been a close link between philosophy in general and
psychiatric theorizing. Here, I will restrict myself to recent philos-
ophy of mind approaches, as they are targeting similar problems
as biological psychiatry: what is the connection between mind
and brain? The idea behind consulting philosophy is simple: if
we better understand how mental states are related to brain states
wemight better understand how disorderedmental states relate to
disordered brain states. Take for example the thesis of identity the-
ory that assumes that mental states are identical with brain states.
If this is true, it seems to follow straightforwardly that disordered
mental states simply are disordered brain states. Or take the prob-
lem of reductionism andmental causation: if wewere really able to
show that mental states can be reduced to brain states, this would
leave us with only two possibilities: either we have to eliminate
mental states, because they are nothing more than a convenient,
folk psychological way to talk about hidden brain states or we have
to conclude that mental states are epiphenomenal, i.e., have no
causal powers. This seems like a conclusion only few people would
like to embrace. Or take the idea of dualism. Dowe have to assume
a special substance that does all the work in explaining mentality
that is in a separate ontological realm outside of physical reality?
However, if we dwell too deep into the heart of philosophy of
mind, the danger is great, that we will end up with metaphysical
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debates that might too easily be dismissed as theoretical talk with
no direct relevance for psychiatry. Instead, I will refer here to two
examples of the relevance of philosophy of mind for psychiatry:
one speciﬁc approach of a theory of mental disorder by a philoso-
pher (George Graham) and one family of problems discussed in
contemporary philosophy of mind, namely if mental states extend
beyond the brain in a relevant sense.
A comprehensive and accessible version of linking philosophy
of mind and mental disorders has been given by Graham (2013).
In his theory he explains what mental disorders are, according
to which (normative) criteria we classify them as clinically rele-
vant and how they differ as mental disorders from proper brain
(=neurological) disorders. According to Graham a mental disor-
der is a disability, incapacity or impairment in one or more basic
or fundamental mental faculties of psychological capacities of a
person that has harmful or likely harmful consequences for its
subject. It is a disorder because it is harmful and undesirable for
the subject, whether the subject himself appreciates this or not. In
more concrete terms this means that the person is worse off with
than without the disorder, that the disorder has a non-voluntary
and personally uncontrollable nature and that the disorder cannot
be excised or extirpated by the mere addition of other psychologi-
cal resources. For example, the delusion of a paranoid person will
not be alleviated by giving more information about the content
of his delusion and the sadness of a depressed person will not be
cured by cheering him up. Mental disorders are mental disorders
because they are brought about by a mix of mental forces and
brute a-rational neural mechanisms, or at least Graham argues so.
The crucial point here naturally is what Graham means by mental
forces. He explicitly states that he is not a dualist. Rather, he tries to
argue what the“mental” inmental disorders refers to. Themark of
the mental is that states of mind are constituted by either or both
of two elements, i.e., consciousness and intentionality. Only if the
causal mechanisms bringing about or sustaining a mental disor-
der work through conscious and/or intentional states, so Graham
claims, they should be categorized as mental disorders. Mental
symptoms that arise from brute brain affections (like stroke, neu-
rodegeneration, or infection) are neurological disorders even if
they present with (secondary) mental symptoms. Also, the men-
tal is decisive for the criteria when a mental state of mind should
be regarded as a disorder and not as a variant of normal mind
life: namely when they impact a person’s reason-responsiveness or
rationality considerably without totally destroying it.
In Graham’s theory the mental plays a prominent role in sev-
eral respects: ﬁrst, because the mechanisms causing or sustaining
mental disorders are supposed to work through those brainmech-
anisms that implement mental (intentional and/or conscious)
states and thus through mental qua mental. Second, the nor-
mative criteria for clinical relevance (and thereby the criteria for
separating normality from disorder) rely on the impairment of
intentionality and rationality, i.e., marks of the mental. Thirdly,
he argues that mental disorders (like panic attacks, schizophrenia,
depression) should and can be distinguished from proper neuro-
logical brain disorders (like stroke, Parkinson, Alzheimer) by the
fact that the latter are brought about by pure mechanical, brute,
a-rational affections of the brain that moreover are not sensitive
to psychological (mental) treatment. In contrast, the “mental” in
mental disorders has a double role: ﬁrst it is characterized by an
impairment of intentionality and rationality and second, because
these marks of the mental are not totally absent but within the
symptoms there is still a sense of rationality and intentionality
preserved.
A problem in Graham’s theory is his explication of mental
forces. Sometimes, he seems to imply that rationality or inten-
tionality have a causal power of their own, although he denies
that. But the worth of his approach for biological psychiatry seems
for me that he insists on the relevance of the role of the men-
tal in understanding, explaining and identifying mental disorders
against pure brain disorders and non-pathological mind states on
the other. In fact, many proponents of biological psychiatry now
accept an interplay of neurobiological and psychological (mental)
factors. However, if the mental is identical with the neural what
does this claim of interaction amounts to? So let us turn then to
the important question, if the mental can really be reduced to the
neural.
In philosophy and in cognitive sciences there exist a number
of proposals that doubt that cognitive processes (for our purpose:
mental states) are best understood as only internal processes that
happen within a cognitive system (in our case: the brain). Inter-
nal approaches, so the basic idea, ignore that cognitive processes
are situated, i.e., that they essentially depend on (weak version),
or even may be constituted by (strong version), their embodi-
ment and the interactionwith the natural, technological and social
environment. There is not yet a consistent or complete theory of
situatedness, rather there are several strands of research and the-
orizing that can be subsumed under the catchword “the 4Es”: the
embodied, extended, embedded and enacted mind (Lyre andWal-
ter, 2013). The main idea is that in order to understand what
cognition (the mental) is, it is necessary to take into account that
cognitive capacities of a system may depend on the fact that those
systems (our brains) are (i) embodied, i.e., coupled to our bodily
constitution and that it therefore is necessary to regard the bodily
realization of cognitive abilities as an integral part of the cognitive
architecture; (ii) situationally embedded, i.e. are dependent in a
speciﬁc way on their environment, i.e., cognitive systems exploit
the speciﬁc circumstances of their environmental context in order
to increase their performative abilities, (iii) extended, i.e., extend
over the boundaries of our body into the technological or social
environment and thus are constituted not only by internal factors
but also by external, environmental factors and (iv) enacted, i.e.,
arise only by the active interaction of an autonomous systems with
its environment (Walter, 2010).
The thesis of embodiment has a long tradition in phenomeno-
logical philosophy, e.g., in the writings of Merleau-Ponty. The
thesis of the extended mind has more recently been introduced
into the debate by a paper published in 1998 (Clark and Chalmers,
1998). They introduce an example of an external device for
memory (a cognitive process) that has since then been discussed
extensively in the literature. The example refers to the notebook of
Otto, an Alzheimer patient with memory problems who uses his
notebook instead of his normal physiological memory in order to
remember certain things. The argument is that if the entries into
the notebook play the same role in Ottos life and in the explana-
tion of his behavior as neurally implemented memory contents
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in healthy adults, it would be arbitrary or neural chauvinism if
we would not regard them in the same way as genuine parts of
the material substrates of his normal memories and beliefs. The
general form of the argument inherent in this example is called the
parity principle: if a part of theworld functions in away that, would
it happen in our brain, we would have no hesitation in recognizing
as part of a cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of
the cognitive process. To make this part of the process more plau-
sible it is easy to modify the example such that the notebook is
constructed as a brain-computer-interface, e.g., as a digital device
coupled more directly to the brain, for example in a technological
advanced form of the actually existing google glasses.
Why could the 4E thesis be relevant to understand the nature
of mental disorders? Because they regard processes external to the
brain as constitutive for mental processes and thus also as consti-
tutive for disordered, pathological mental processes. An example,
where this might be relevant is ADHD. ADHD might be only
correctly diagnosed as a mental disorder if the external world
is such that adolescents grow up in an environment that favors
attentional distraction and punishes hyperactivity. In a similar
vein, anorexia nervosa, a severe and often deadly mental dis-
order in Western countries seems to be much less frequent or
even non-existent in environments in which a slim ﬁgure and
control of eating and weight is not promoted, like in poor coun-
tries in Africa. These facts seem to draw into doubt that every
currently acknowledged mental disorder is best categorized as a
pure brain disorder – which is not to deny that internal pro-
cesses of the brain play an important role if speciﬁc circumstances
hold.
The main point which I would like to make here is that bio-
logical psychiatry has to take into account theories about how
the mental is constituted. The new wave of biological psychiatry
might be able to incorporate these issues into its conceptualization
of mental disorders – but only if it comes along with a consistent
theory of the mental that should take into account arguments and
insights of philosophy of mind.
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